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and an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. We particularly focus on the impact of the global
financial crisis (GFC) from 2007 onwards on retail finance demand and analyse four submarkets (period
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household goods and debt consolidation, etc.) (Dec 1988–Jun 2010), credit card loans (Mar 1990–Jun
2010), and margin loans (Sep 2000–Jun 2010). Other than the indicator lending rates and annual full-time
earnings respectively used as proxies for the price and income effects, we specify a large number of other
variables as demand factors, particularly reflecting the value of the asset for which retail finance demand is
derived. These variously include the yield on indexed bonds as a proxy for inflation expectations, median
housing prices, consumer sentiment indices as measures of consumer confidence, motor vehicle and retail
trade sales, housing debt-to-housing assets as a measure of leverage, the proportion of protected margin
lending, the available credit limit on credit cards, and the All Ordinaries Index. In the long run, we find
significant price elasticities only for term loans and margin loans, and significant income elasticities of demand
for housing loans, term loans and margin loans. We also find that the GFC only significantly affected the long-
run demand for term loans and margin loans. In the short run, we find that the GFC has had a significant
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demand is certainly price inelastic but more income elastic than conventionally thought.
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Price and Income Elasticity of Australian 
Retail Finance: An Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) Approach 
Helen Higgs1 and Andrew C. Worthington1 
Abstract  
This paper models the price and income elasticity of retail finance in Australia using 
aggregate quarterly data and an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. We 
particularly focus on the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) from 2007 onwards on 
retail finance demand and analyse four submarkets (period analysed in brackets): owner-
occupied housing loans (Sep 1985–June 2010), term loans (for motor vehicles, household 
goods and debt consolidation, etc.) (Dec 1988–Jun 2010), credit card loans (Mar 1990–Jun 
2010), and margin loans (Sep 2000–Jun 2010). Other than the indicator lending rates and 
annual full-time earnings respectively used as proxies for the price and income effects, we 
specify a large number of other variables as demand factors, particularly reflecting the value 
of the asset for which retail finance demand is derived. These variously include the yield on 
indexed bonds as a proxy for inflation expectations, median housing prices, consumer 
sentiment indices as measures of consumer confidence, motor vehicle and retail trade sales, 
housing debt-to-housing assets as a measure of leverage, the proportion of protected margin 
lending, the available credit limit on credit cards, and the All Ordinaries Index. In the long 
run, we find significant price elasticities only for term loans and margin loans, and significant 
income elasticities of demand for housing loans, term loans and margin loans. We also find 
that the GFC only significantly affected the long-run demand for term loans and margin 
loans. In the short run, we find that the GFC has had a significant effect on the price elasticity 
of demand for term loans and margin loans. Expected inflation is also a key factor affecting 
retail finance demand. Overall, most of the submarkets in the analysis indicate that retail 
finance demand is certainly price inelastic but more income elastic than conventionally 
thought. 
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Retail finance, also known as consumer credit or household credit, is where the payment for 
goods or services purchased by individuals or households directly as consumers is not at the 
moment of purchase, but rather takes the form of repayments over a period under some 
prearranged payment plan. This general definition therefore encompasses financing activities 
as diverse as non-revolving credit loans—for the purchase of new and existing houses and 
land, motor vehicles, debt consolidation, household appliances, furnishings and other durable 
goods and holidays—and revolving credit loans, again for the purchase of durable goods, but 
also nondurable goods and services of all types, debt refinancing and margin lending.  
In Australia, as elsewhere, retail finance thus represents a significant amount of the 
financial resources available in the economy and thereby an important determinant of 
household economic and social welfare. For example, in 2009–10, secured finance 
commitments to individuals totalled $180 billion for the purchase of new and existing 
dwellings and $5 billion for alternations. At the same time, personal finance commitments 
amounted to $371 billion for the purchase of new and used motor vehicles, $25 billion for 
household and other personal goods and services, $17 billion for debt consolidation, along 
with revolving credit facilities of $3,462 billion.          
Clearly, a sound understanding of the demand for retail finance is then of importance for 
several parties for a number of reasons. These include, among others, the macro impact of 
consumer credit on the interest rate transmission channel of monetary policy for central 
bankers, on micro uses by regulators for assessing financial stability, and for industry users 
seeking to understand the evolution of credit markets and the impact of credit demand on 
purchasing behaviour. One particular focus here is the price and income elasticities of 
demand and how changes in prices and incomes, among other things, affect the demand for 
the different components of retail finance.  
The needs of those interested in better understanding the conditions of retail finance 
demand also change over time, often rapidly. For instance, for most of the 1990s and 2000s, 
household debt in Australia (as in most developed economies) grew significantly, driven by 
surging housing prices, buoyant stock markets, and brisk innovation in consumer goods 
markets. Given the 2007–11 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), these same economies are now 
experiencing slowing credit demand if not rapid deleveraging, with households increasingly 
reining in consumption and saving more than ever. For example, during the most recent 
quarter, in seasonally adjusted terms the total value of owner-occupied housing commitments 
excluding alterations and additions in Australia fell 4.6%, while personal revolving credit 
commitments fell by 14.5% and fixed lending commitments by 4.5%. This has important 
implications for future economic recovery. 
Unfortunately, despite the patent need for a sound understanding of retail finance 
demand, there is no known academic study in Australia that examines these important issues. 
Elsewhere, an emerging literature employing both macro and microanalyses is in evidence. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to estimate demand equations for retail finance. The 
main novelties of our work are twofold. First, we use aggregate data over a relatively long 
period in conjunction with advanced time-series techniques. We particularly focus on the 
price and income elasticities of demand and the impact of the GFC on the dynamics of retail 
finance markets. Second, while some lending submarkets have been intensively examined 
overseas (but not in Australia), such as home loans, far fewer studies concern the demand for 
non-revolving credit items like term loans, and even fewer concern forms of revolving credit 
like credit cards and margin loans. In response, we estimate separate demand functions for 
owner-occupied housing loans, term loans, credit card loans and margin loans. 
The remainder of the paper comprises five sections. Section 2 discusses the estimation 
approach and Section 3 presents the variable specification. Section 4 details the models 




estimated and Section 5 provides the results. The paper ends with some concluding remarks 
in Section 6. 
2. Estimation approach 
The method we employ to estimate the price and income elasticity of retail finance in 
Australia is to specify the demand (as measured by consumption) of four types of retail 
finance as regressands and indicator rates, and household income and other factors as 
regressors using the bounds test and autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration 
procedure developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). Recent empirical applications in a variety of 
contexts include De Vita and Abbott (2004), Narayan (2005), Narayan and Smyth (2005), 
Fosu and Magnus (2006), Tang (2007) and Pahlavani and Rahimi (2009). This technique has 
three main advantages over earlier cointegration techniques when applied to the aggregate 
data in our study. Firstly, it is relatively simple compared with the Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) multivariate cointegration technique as ARDL permits the cointegration relationship 
to be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) once we identify the lag order of the 
model.  
Secondly, the chosen approach is applicable irrespective of whether the regressors are 
purely stationary without any trend—and thus integrated of order zero or I(0)]—or with a unit 
root (a random walk), and therefore either integrated of order one or I(1)] or mutually 
cointegrated. Nevertheless, it will produce spurious results for I(2) or higher series so 
differencing is still required to reduce these to I(1). Finally, the technique is more efficient for 
the small sample size found with our data, a situation where both the Engle and Granger 
(1987) and Johansen (1988, 1991) cointegration methods are considered unreliable. 
The ARDL including bounds test comprises three steps. The first step is to estimate a 
standard log-log specification of the cointegrating long-run relationship for an I(1) dependent 
variable as a function of a vector of I(d) regressors of order 0 < d < 1.  
3. Variable specification 
Four separate retail finance demand equations are estimated. Table 1 provides details of the 
dependent and independent variables in each equation, including the sources of the data, the 
number of quarterly observations and selected descriptive statistics.  
The first retail finance submarket examined is owner-occupied housing loans (HSE). In 
terms of independent variables, we measure the price of housing loans (HPR) with the 
standard variable bank mortgage rate while annual full-time earnings (INC) measure income. 
We expect the signs on the estimated coefficients for these regressors to follow those 
expected for a normal good with a downward sloping (inelastic) demand curve (because of 
limited substitution opportunities) and demand increasing positively, but less than 
proportionately, with income (neither an inferior nor superior good). In addition, we include 
the yield on indexed bonds (INB) as a proxy for expected inflation. All other things being 
equal, higher expected inflation brings forward purchases of the underlying asset and with it 
finance consumed based on this asset. A positive coefficient is hypothesised.  
We make identical assumptions for each of the remaining three dimensions of retail 
finance considered in this analysis (terms, credit card and margin loans), such that the 
expected estimated price elasticity and income elasticity will be negative and positive, 
respectively, and the estimated coefficient on expected inflation is positive. Moreover, we 
expect the price elasticity of demand to be inelastic (the quantity demanded changes less than 
proportionately given a change in prices) so that the estimated coefficient will be less than 
one (negative). In comparison, income elasticity should lie in the range zero to one indicating 
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a less than proportionate change in borrowing with a change in income (negative for an 
inferior good and more than one for a superior good).  
For housing loans, we include several additional demand factors specifically related to 
thr overall housing market and housing finance conditions. These are debt-to-housing assets 
(DTA) as an indicator of leverage (and financial flexibility), for which we expect a positive 
coefficient, and housing interest payments-to-disposable income (RTD) as a measure of debt 
servicing requirements, for which we expect a negative coefficient associated with increasing 
mortgage stress. We also include the median housing price (MHP) to reflect the price level of 
the underlying asset, for which we expect a positive coefficient. As all of the above data have 
been collected over the longest period, we are able to obtain 100 quarterly observations for 
each variable, beginning in September 1985 and ending in June 2010.  
The second submarket of retail finance demand is term loans, comprising loans for 
motor vehicles, household goods, debt consolidation, etc. We measure the quantity demanded 
with the amount of fixed term lending commitments (TLN) and again specify the price with 
an indicator lending rate, but this time for fixed term loans (TPR), income with full-time 
earnings (INC) and the impact of expected inflation with the yield on indexed bonds (INB). 
As discussed we expect similar signs as above for the estimated coefficients for price (–), 
income (+) and expected inflation (–). However, as the demand for term loans most closely 
aligns with conditions in retail goods markets for which the demand for finance is a derived 
demand, we also include the volume of retail trade (RET) and motor vehicle sales (MVS), 
along with the Westpac–Melbourne Institute consumer sentiment index (CMS) as an indicator 
of consumer confidence. We expect positive coefficients when we specify these additional 
demand factors as regressors. Unfortunately, data are available on some of these variables for 
only a shorter period than housing loans so we are only able to obtain 87 quarterly 
observations, again ending in June 2010 but commencing somewhat later in December 1988.  
The third submarket of retail finance demand is credit card lending, with the quantity 
demanded proxied by the amount of credit used at the end of each quarter (CCS), the price 
with the indicator rate for standard credit cards (CCP), income with annual full-time earning 
(INC) and expected inflation with the yield on indexed bonds (INB). The expected signs on 
the estimated coefficients are again as above. In addition, we include the credit limit at the 
end of the quarter (CPR) to represent the theoretical borrowing limit. All other things being 
equal, the amount borrowed should increase alongside the facility for borrowing. As with 
terms loans, we include the value of retail trade (RET) and the consumer sentiment index 
(CMS) to proxy for the impact of retail sales and consumer confidence on credit card-related 
purchases. We again expect the last two variables to display positive coefficients when they 
serve as regressors for credit card loans. The maximum data period available here is slightly 
shorter than for terms loans, so we obtain 82 quarterly observations, starting in March 1990 
and ending in June 2010. 
The final submarket of retail finance demand is margin loans, defined as the aggregate 
value of outstanding loans backed by approved securities (usually Australian equities and 
managed funds). The data are from a survey of banks and brokerage firms offering margin-
lending facilities, with market coverage of at least 95%. Margin loans are the most common 
way that Australian households borrow to invest in equities. They typically involve the 
borrower lodging cash, shares or managed funds with the lender, which then provides a line 
of credit—the margin loan—to purchase additional shares and managed funds, which then 
also become security for the loan. The collection of most of the variables defined here has 
been only over for a relatively short period, so we are able to specify just 40 quarterly 
observations, starting in September 2000 and ending in June 2010. The dependent variable is 
the amount of margin lending (MLN) with the yield on indexed bonds (INB) and annual full-




time earnings (INC) again proxying for the effect of expected inflation and income. We use 
the indicator rate on margin loans (MPR) to represent the price of margin loans. 
We include an additional four factors of demand specific to margin loans. The first of 
these is the proportion of protected margin lending (PRP). This refers to margin loans 
packaged with a derivative product that guarantees that the capital value of the underlying 
portfolio does not fall. Lenders typically charge a higher rate of interest for providing a 
capital protection facility. We expect a positive coefficient when margin lending is regressed 
against the proportion of protected margin lending, reflecting that borrowers face less risk 
when using these facilities and are therefore more likely to draw down margin loans. The 
second additional demand factor for margin lending is the proportion of lending-to-aggregate 
credit limit (PLA). The aggregate credit limit is the sum of the approved loan limits of 
lenders, and therefore represents the total amount lenders are willing to lend under margin 
loans. Naturally, we expect the amount of margin lending to increase alongside the aggregate 
credit limit. We again hypothesise a positive coefficient.  
The third additional demand factor for margin loans is the proportion of the aggregate 
credit limit-to-value of underlying security (PAS). The value of the underlying security is the 
market value of all securities backing the margin lending at the end of the quarter, so we 
expect margin lending in aggregate will increase with the value of the underlying security. 
The final additional demand factor for margin loans is the ASX All Ordinaries Index (ASX). 
This is a proxy for market conditions relating to the current and expected value of the 
underlying security so we again expect a positive coefficient. 
The final variable addresses the key focus in this study of the 2007–2011 GFC and its 
impact on the price and income elasticity of retail finance demand. In brief, from a retail 
perspective, the period leading up to the GFC is characterised by increasing household debt 
burden and over-leveraging, the growth of retail financial flexibility, innovation, and 
complexity, the apparent mispricing of retail finance risk and burgeoning levels of household 
wealth associated with strong financial and housing markets. In contrast, the period during 
and after the GFC is exemplified by deteriorating conditions in housing markets and housing 
finance, declines in overall economic activity and certainty, falling consumer wealth, and a 
marked deterioration in consumer confidence. To reflect these changes we define a dummy 
variable for the GFC and post-GFC environment that takes a value of one for all quarters 
from March 2008 to June 2010, otherwise zero. We employ this dummy variable as both a 
constant and as an interaction variable with the price and income elasticities of demand for 
each of the retail finance submarkets.  
4. Model specification 





where Y is loans in each of the retail finance submarkets (HSE, TLN CCS and MLN), 0 is 
drift, 1 is an autoregressive parameter, 2, 3,i are long-run multipliers for the explanatory 
variables, Price is respectively HPR, TPR, CPR and MPR, Income is INB, Xit-i is i = 4, 
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ensure the residuals, t, are white noise identically and independently distributed (i.i.d),  m+i  
i = 4, 5,6 and ij are first-differenced parameters where p is the number of lags, m+7 is the 
estimated coefficient for the  dummy variable, GFC, and all other variables are as previously 
defined.  
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS in order to test for the existence of a long-run 
relationship among the lagged levels of the explanatory variables by conducting a joint F-test 
to determine the significance of the coefficients of these slope variables. The null hypothesis 
of no cointegration among the variables in Equation (1) is tested using H0: 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 
…. = m+1 = 0 against the alternative H1: 1  2  3  4 ….  m+1  0. Two sets of critical 
values reported in Pesaran et al. (2001) provide critical values bounds of the test for 
cointegration, when the explanatory variables are assumed I(d) where 0 < d < 1. The lower 
critical value of the bounds test assumes the regressors are I(0) and the upper value assumes 
the regressors are I(1). If the F-statistic is above the critical upper limit, then the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating long-run relationship can be rejected, irrespective of the orders 
of integration of the individual time series. Conversely, if the F-statistic is below the lower 
critical value, then the null hypothesis of no cointegrating long-run relationship cannot be 
rejected. If the F-statistic falls between these critical values, the test is inconclusive.
 
In the second step, once cointegration has been established the conditional ARDL (1,  p 















This involves selecting the orders of the ARDL (1, p lags for each explanatory variable) 
model using the Akaike information criteria (AIC). The third and final step involves the 
estimation of the short-run dynamic parameters using the error correction model (ECM) 
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where ij i = 1, 2, 3, …. m, j = 1, 2…. q are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the 
convergence of the model to equilibrium and ECR is the speed of adjustment. Note that as 
GFC is by nature long run (fixed from March 2008 to June 2010) we do not include it as a 
constant in the ECM, though we retain its short-run interactions with the price and income 
variables. 
5. Empirical results 
The ARDL bounds test for cointegration used in this study does not depend on pre-testing the 
order of integration. Nonetheless, a unit root test is conducted on all variables as the 
procedure does require that all variables are either I(0) or I(1). We employ a relatively more 
efficient autoregressive univariate Dickey–Fuller generalised least squares (DF-GLS) unit 
root test (Elliot et al. 1996). This is a modification of the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) 
unit root t-test with the application of generalised least squares (GLS) which de-trends the 
series before applying the ADF test. In general, the DF-GLS test outperforms the ADF test in 
relation to sample size and power. The DF-GLS test includes a constant and trend for the log 
level series and a constant with no trend for the difference of the log level series. In Table 2, 




we present the DF-GLS unit root tests and the critical values for each set of variables in the 
four demand equations. Note that even though some variables are the same across all (INB 
and INC) or some (RET and CMS) of the four demand equations, the critical values for the 
unit root tests will vary according to the number of observations available. For the most part, 
while some series are stationary in levels or I(0), nearly all variables are stationary in first-
differences or I(1). This indicates that the data is suitable for applying the ARDL procedure. 
In order to conduct the bounds test for cointegration, the first step taken in the ARDL 
procedure is to test for the log-run relationship in Equation (1). We employ a maximum lag 
order of one given the relatively large number of explanatory variables and the short sample 
period. Equation (1) is estimated using OLS regression. The joint F-test is conducted on the 
lagged log-level variables while the differenced variables have no direct influence on the 
bounds cointegration test (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997). The F-statistic tests the joint null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the lagged log-levels are equal to zero which implies that 
no cointegrating long-run relationship exists. The calculated F-statistic for housing loans 
(HSE) is 1.86 which is lower than the simulated upper bound critical value for k = 9 and n = 
78 with unrestricted intercept and trend at the .07 level of significance. As this falls in the 
inconclusive region, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, indicating 
that a long-run cointegrating relationship may not exist between the dependent and 
explanatory variables in this model. With terms loans, credit card loans and margin loans, the 
respective calculated F-statistics of 2.47, 3.68 and 3.75 are higher than the upper bound 
critical values for k = 9, 9 and 10 and k = 65, 60 and 16, respectively, with unrestricted 
intercepts and trends at the .02, .01 and .01 levels of significance. Accordingly, in these cases, 
we conclude the presence of a long-run cointegrating relationship. That is, the variables tend 
to move together, or at least not too far apart, over time. 
The second step of the ARDL procedure is to estimate the long-run model for the logs of 
HSE, TLN, CCS, and MLN in line with Equation (2). This equation is estimated using the 
ARDL (1, 0, 0,…0) specification according to the AIC criterion of optimal lag selection. We 
specified various lags in the models with the aim of optimising the overall goodness-of-fit of 
each model. Table 2 presents the results with the long-run estimated coefficients, standard 
errors and p-values in columns 2–4 for HSE in the first panel, TLN in the second panel, CCS 
in the third panel and MLN in the fourth panel. Consider the results for HSE. Other than 
lagged HSE (which indicates a 69.4% probability of a one-quarter increase in housing loans 
being followed by another) three explanatory variables exert a significant (10% or lower) 
effect on housing loans in the long run: namely, INB, MPH and INC.  
In terms of the main focus of the analysis, the price of housing loans (HPR) is not a 
significant demand factor in the long run, whereas the income elasticity (INC) of 1.46 is 
significant and positive in line with expectations, suggesting housing is not strictly a normal 
good (demand changes more than proportionately with income). Inflation expectations (INB) 
are significant and consistent with our expected sign, such that a 1% increase in expected 
inflation (INB) leading to a 0.27% decrease in HSE (reduced demand for housing loans). The 
coefficient for median housing prices (MHP) is also significant, but does not display the 
expected positive sign. The estimated coefficient here indicates that a 1% increase in median 
housing prices (MHP) reduces the demand for housing loans by 0.44%. Interestingly, neither 
the constant nor the interactions terms for GFC are significant, thereby indicating that the 
GFC has had no significant effect on long-run housing loan demand at the aggregate level. 
Overall, the model is highly significant, with an R2 of 0.99 and the F-statistics of 1055.19 
rejecting the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of the slope coefficients at the .01 
level. 
Now consider the demand for term loans shown in the second panel of Table 3. As 
shown, four factors (other than lagged terms loans indicating a probability of 72.2% of a one-
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quarter increase in terms loans being followed by another) are significant in the long-run: 
TPR (the price of terms loans), INB (inflation expectations), GFC x INC (the interaction of 
the GFC with income) and GFC (as a constant). The estimated coefficient for TPR as the 
price of terms loans is significant and negative indicating that terms loans are indeed price 
inelastic (the quantity demanded changes less than proportionately with a change in price). 
We can also see that a 1% increase in expected inflation is associated with a decrease in the 
terms loans of .10%. As for the impact of the GFC, there is strong evidence of an overall 
decrease in demand for term loans because of the GFC (–15.461, p-value = 0.021). There is 
also the suggestion that income, which is not typically a significant factor, has become 
significant with the interaction term, such that during and after the GFC term loans have 
become a superior good (demand increasing more than proportionately with income). Once 
again, the model is highly significant and accounts for 98.41% of the variation in terms loans 
over the sample period.       
The estimated results for credit card loans are in the second panel of Table 3. Only a 
single demand factor other than lagged credit card loans is significant in the long run, 
namely, the credit limit at the end of the previous quarter (CCP). The value of –0.172 
indicates that a 1% increase in the credit card limit is associated with a 0.17% decrease in 
credit usage. The overall model is again strongly jointly significant and explains 99.9% of the 
variation in credit card use, while there is not a statistically significant price or income effect 
with credit card usage at the aggregate level, nor any impact of the GFC, in the long run. 
The final long run demand model in Table 3 is for margin loans (MLN). We first can see 
that the probability of a one-quarter increase in margin loans being followed by another is 
34.3%. We can also see that aggregate margin loans exhibit a significant and positive price 
effect of –0.418 (price inelastic) and are highly income elastic (2.487) (a superior good). 
Other significant demand factors for margin loans are the positive impacts of the proportion 
of aggregate lending-to-aggregate credit limit (PLA), the proportion of aggregate credit limit-
to-value of the underlying security (PAS), and the ASX All Ordinaries Index (ASX). All other 
things being equal, a 1% in aggregate lending-to-aggregate credit limit will increase margin 
loans by 0.83%, a 1% increase in aggregate credit limit-to-value of the underlying security 
will increase margin loans by 0.48%, while a 1% increase in the ASX All Ords will increase 
margin loans by 0.74%. Importantly, we can evidence the highly detrimental effect of the 
GFC on the demand for margin loans with the interaction of GFC with income elasticity 
being highly significant and negative, suggesting that while before the GFC margin loans 
were a superior good, during and after the GFC they are a inferior good (quantity of demand 
falling with an increase in income).       
The third and final step of the ARDL procedure is to estimate the short-run dynamic 
coefficients associated with the ECM from the long-run relationship as specified in Equation 
(3). The results are in columns 6–8 in Table 2 with those for HSE in the first panel, TLN in 
the second panel, CCS in the third panel and MLN in the fourth panel. We first consider the 
overall fit and dynamics of both models. First, the long-run models are clearly better able to 
explain the variations in retail finance demand than the short-run models, with the HSE 
model explaining 41.05% of the variation in housing finance demand in the short run 
(compared to 99.17% in the long run), TLN explaining 31.73% of variation in the short run 
and 98.84% in the long, CCS 64.59% of variation in the short run and 99.99% in the long run. 
The only possible exception is the demand function for margin loans where the model 
explains 94.6% of the variation in the short-run model and 99.72% in the long run. Second, 
the estimated error correction coefficients (ECR) of –0.689 for the HSE mode, –0.745 for the 
TLN model, –0.704 for the CCS model and –1.128 for the MLN model are significant at the 
1% level of significance. These indicate the high speed of adjustment to equilibrium after a 




shock: that is, most of the deviation in the demand factors from a previous quarter’s shock 
converges back to the long-run equilibrium in the current quarter. 
We now focus on the differences in the estimated coefficients in the long and short-run 
models for each type of retail finance demand, starting again with housing loans (HSE). Once 
again, apart from the lagged value of housing loan demand, expected inflation (INB) has a 
significant negative effect on the demand for housing loans in the short run. The only other 
significant factor is housing interest payments-to-disposable income (debt servicing). There is 
again no significant short-run price while the income effect that was significant in the long 
run is no longer significant. There is also no significant short-run effect of the GFC on the 
demand for housing loans at the aggregate level, either in itself or through changes in the 
price or income elasticity of housing loan demand. 
For term loans in the short run (TLN), we can see that the GFC has made the price 
elasticity of demand for term loans even more inelastic, while the demand for term loans is 
strongly positively associated with retail trade such that a 1% increase in retail trade is 
associated with a 1.51% increase in the demand for term loans. Expected inflation (INB) 
remains a significant demand factor in the short run while there is no obvious impact of the 
GFC. The income elasticity of term loans is no longer significant. With credit cards, the only 
significant coefficient other than lagged credit card loans is the price of credit card loans 
(CPR), with the indication that credit cards are price inelastic in the short run but that the 
demand for credit card loans is largely unresponsive to the price of these loans in the long 
run. 
Finally, with margin loans (MLN) we can see that PLA, PAS and ASX remain significant 
in the short run as in the long run. The proportion of protected margin lending (PRP) is now 
significant in the short run, suggesting that the presence of this facility increases the demand 
for margin loans. As for price elasticity, no significant effect is found except since the GFC 
when the price elasticity of demand has become significantly more elastic (positive). Income 
elasticity is also positive and highly elastic in the short run as in the long run, though the 
significant negative value on income elasticity since the GFC suggests that margin loans have 
become somewhat less income elastic.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper uses the ARDL procedure to model demand equations for four submarkets of 
retail finance: housing loans, terms loans, credit card loans, and margin loans for various 
sample periods up to 25 years and until June 2010. Panel unit root tests are used to indicate 
that all of the quarterly series in the analysis are either stationary in levels or I(0) or in first-
differences or I(1). The bounds testing procedure for cointegration subsequently finds long-
run cointegrating relationships in all models except for housing loans where the results are 
marginally inconclusive. 
In the long run, we find significant price elasticities only for term loans and margin 
loans, and significant income elasticities of demand for housing loans, term loans and margin 
loans. We also find that the GFC has only significantly affected the long-run demand for term 
loans and margin loans. In the short run, we find that the GFC has had a significant effect on 
the price elasticity of demand for term loans and margin loans, with only credit card loans 
exhibiting a significant price elasticity of demand otherwise. Expected inflation is also a key 
factor affecting retail finance demand. Overall, most of the submarkets in the analysis 
indicate that retail finance demand is price inelastic but more income elastic than 
conventionally thought. 
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TABLE 1. Variable descriptions and selected descriptive statistics 
















) HSE Housing finance commitments for owner-occupation ($m) ABS Sep-85 Jun-10 100 2304.89 52234.41 19478.81 14600.77 0.75 
HPR Indicator rate, Standard variable bank mortgage rate (%) RBA Sep-85 Jun-10 100 5.80 17.00 9.69 3.42 0.35 
DTA Housing debt-to-housing assets (leverage) (%) RBA Sep-85 Jun-10 100 10.28 31.10 18.90 6.20 0.33 
RTD Housing interest payments-to-disposable income (debt servicing) (%) RBA Sep-85 Jun-10 100 4.02 11.19 6.05 1.86 0.31 
INB Yield on indexed bonds (%) RBA Sep-85 Jun-10 100 2.15 5.94 3.96 1.09 0.28 
MHP Median housing price ($) ABS Sep-85 Jun-10 100 65900.00 534800.00 210797.50 126634.77 0.60 





































) TLN Lending commitments fixed term credit ($m) ABS Dec-88 Jun-10 87 2875.57 11815.62 6237.45 2377.77 0.38 
TPR Indicator rate fixed term loans, (%) RBA Dec-88 Jun-10 87 10.90 20.70 13.86 2.79 0.20 
RET Retail trade ($m) ABS Dec-88 Jun-10 87 25422.90 59707.00 40144.26 11142.03 0.28 
MVS Motor vehicle sales (000s) ABS Dec-88 Jun-10 87 127.98 271.26 194.53 43.64 0.22 
CMS Westpac-Melbourne Institute consumer sentiment index (n) MI Dec-88 Jun-10 87 67.36 123.02 101.07 13.06 0.13 
INB Yield on indexed bonds (%) RBA Dec-88 Jun-10 87 2.15 5.63 3.77 1.04 0.28 








CCS Credit used at end of quarter ($m) ABS Mar-90 Jun-10 82 33879.81 368573.18 163724.82 119967.34 0.73 
CCP Indicator rate standard credit cards (%) RBA Mar-90 Jun-10 82 14.40 23.50 17.56 2.45 0.14 
CPR Credit limit at end of quarter ($m) ABS Mar-90 Jun-10 82 25955.25 292915.02 122170.11 89267.21 0.73
RET Retail trade ($m) ABS Mar-90 Jun-10 82 26203.00 59707.00 41013.05 10886.08 0.27 
CMS Westpac-Melbourne Institute consumer sentiment index (n) MI Mar-90 Jun-10 82 67.36 123.02 102.00 12.58 0.12 
INB Yield on indexed bonds (%) RBA Mar-90 Jun-10 82 2.15 5.63 3.73 1.05 0.28 









MLN Margin lending ($m) RBA Sep-00 Jun-10 40 6739.00 37767.00 18284.55 8774.42 0.48 
MPR Indicator rate margin loans (%) RBA Sep-00 Jun-10 40 7.00 10.50 8.37 0.86 0.10 
PRP Proportion of protected margin lending (p) RBA Sep-00 Jun-10 40 0.04 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.32 
PLA Proportion of lending-to-aggregate credit limit (p) RBA Sep-00 Jun-10 40 0.32 0.80 0.50 0.10 0.21 
PAS Proportion of aggregate credit limit-to-value of underlying security (p) RBA Sep-00 Jun-10 40 0.63 1.54 0.90 0.18 0.20 
ASX ASX All Ordinaries Index (%) ASX Sep-00 Jun-10 40 2778.90 6492.40 4167.57 1050.24 0.25 
INB Yield on indexed bonds (%) RBA Sep-00 Jun-10 40 2.15 3.62 2.87 0.46 0.16 
INC Annual  full-time earnings ($)  ABS Sep-00 Jun-10 40 41246.40 65114.40 52112.06 7000.68 0.13 




TABLE 2. Optimal lag and unit root test results 
 






















lnHSE 0 –2.8376 lnHSE – – I(0) 
lnHPR 1 –2.4804 lnHPR 0 –5.0368 I(1) 
lnDTA 1 –2.3291 lnDTA 0 –4.8137 I(1) 
lnRTD 1 –2.2003 lnRTD 0 –4.4289 I(1) 
lnINB 2 –3.5628 lnINB 1 –4.4150 I(1) 
lnMHP 2 –2.7405 lnMHP 1 –4.9107 I(1) 
lnINC 0 –0.9837 lnINC 0 –7.3151 I(1) 
Critical values 
1% level – –3.5876 1% level – –2.5890 –
5% level – –3.0364 5% level – –1.9441 –











lnTLN 0 –2.5828 lnTLN 0 –9.0816 I(1) 
lnTPR 1 –0.5407 lnTPR 1 –3.3765 I(1) 
lnRET 1 –1.7878 lnRET 1 –4.7009 I(1) 
lnMVS 0 –2.3559 lnMVS 3 –4.7353 I(1) 
lnCMS 0 –3.3436 lnCMS 0 –7.1275 I(1) 
lnINB 0 –2.9015 lnINB 0 –11.834 I(1) 
lnINC 0 –1.2678 lnINC 1 –4.3063 I(1) 
Critical values 
1% level – –3.6332 1% level – –2.5924 –
5% level – –3.0748 5% level – –1.9446 –












lnCCS 4 –1.9350 lnCCS 0 –4.7710 I(1) 
lnCPR 3 –1.2100 lnCPR 2 –3.4086 I(1) 
lnCCP 1 –1.4554 lnCCP 0 –4.9987 I(1) 
lnRET 0 –1.9551 lnRET 1 –4.0017 I(1) 
lnCMS 0 –3.4450 lnCMS – – I(0) 
lnINB 0 –3.6559 lnINB – – I(0) 
lnINC 0 –1.0789 lnINC 1 –3.8771 I(1) 
Critical values 
1% level – –3.656 1% level – –2.5941 –
5% level – –3.094 5% level – –1.9449 –












lnMLN 2 –1.8778 lnMLN 0 –3.2965 I(1) 
lnMPR 1 –3.5389 lnMPR 0 –3.4756 I(1) 
lnPRP 1 –2.3090 lnPRP 0 –3.8233 I(1) 
lnPLA 0 –2.6500 lnPLA 0 –6.0544 I(1) 
lnPAS 0 –2.5066 lnPAS 0 –5.3493 I(1) 
lnASX 1 –2.0469 lnASX 0 –4.5475 I(1) 
lnINB 1 –1.4874 lnINB 0 –11.6899 I(1) 
lnINC 0 –2.1308 lnINC 0 –4.8200 I(1) 
Critical values 
1% level – –3.7700 1% level – –2.6272 –
5% level – –3.1900 5% level – –1.9498 –








TABLE 3. Estimated long- and short-run models 
Long run Short run 

































CONS. 0.0346 0.0249 0.1685 
lnHSE(–1) 0.6940 0.0731 <0.0001 lnHSE(–1) 0.3996 0.1712 0.0219 
lnHPR(–1) –0.1326 0.1755 0.4522 lnHPR(–1) –0.1857 0.2211 0.4033 
GFClnHPR(–1) –0.2476 0.1616 0.1290 GFClnHPR(–
1) 
–0.1460 0.2326 0.5319 
lnDTA(–1) –0.1971 0.1676 0.2430 lnDTA(–1) –0.2847 0.5172 0.5834 
lnRTD(–1) 0.1273 0.1966 0.5191 lnRTD(–1) –0.5302 0.2856 0.0668 
lnINB(–1) –0.2730 0.0815 0.0012 lnINB(–1) –0.3275 0.0944 0.0008 
lnMHP(–1) –0.4429 0.1810 0.0164 lnMHP(–1) –0.1650 0.2209 0.4571 
lnINC(–1) 1.4578 0.3551 <0.0001 lnINC(–1) –0.6392 1.6853 0.7054 
GFClnINC(–1) –1.1947 1.1089 0.2842 GFClnINC(–1) –3.0480 2.4312 0.2133 
GFC 13.5316 12.4544 0.2802 EHSE(–1) –0.6887 0.1759 0.0002 
R-squared 0.9917 – – R-squared 0.4105 – –

































CONS. 0.0001 0.0163 0.9975 
lnTLN(–1) 0.7253 0.0888 <0.0001 lnTLN(–1) 0.5073 0.2007 0.0136 
lnTPR(–1) –0.1937 0.0986 0.0531 lnTPR(–1) –0.0045 0.2270 0.9841 
GFClnTPR(–
1) 
0.1658 0.1915 0.3892 GFClnTPR(–1) –1.2582 0.7394 0.0931 
lnRET(–1) 0.6465 0.4194 0.1275 lnRET(–1) 1.5132 0.5222 0.0050 
lnMVS(–1) –0.1892 0.1634 0.2505 lnMVS(–1) –0.3874 0.2483 0.1231 
lnCMS(–1) 0.0922 0.0803 0.2544 lnCMS(–1) 0.1006 0.0695 0.1524 
lnINB(–1) –0.1005 0.0533 0.0632 lnINB(–1) –0.1592 0.0678 0.0217 
lnINC(–1) –0.3781 0.3559 0.2915 lnINC(–1) –0.7567 1.1451 0.5108 
GFClnINC(–1) 1.3713 0.6077 0.0270 GFClnINC(–1) 2.1382 1.4488 0.1443 
GFC –15.4608 6.5891 0.0216 ETLN(–1) –0.7456 0.2254 0.0015 
R-squared 0.9841 – – R-squared 0.3173 – –

































CONS. –0.0100 0.0056 0.0781 
lnCCS(–1) –1.0305 0.0259 <0.0001 lnCCS(–1) –0.6137 0.10331 <0.0001 
lnCPR –0.4451 0.7734 0.5667 lnCPR 0.6371 0.0821 <0.0001 
GFClnCPR –0.1161 0.3393 0.7331 GFClnCPR –0.5075 0.4947 0.3085 
lnCCP –0.1724 0.0584 0.0043 lnCCP 0.0429 0.0654 0.5134 
lnCMS –0.2035 0.2173 0.3522 lnCMS 0.0378 0.0258 0.1478 
lnINB 0.0315 0.0452 0.4889 lnINB 0.0353 0.0218 0.1091 
lnINC 1.5146 2.7182 0.5791 lnINC 0.2229 0.3990 0.5782 
GFClnINC –0.6935 1.5858 0.6632 GFClnINC 0.5448 0.6705 0.4192 
GFC 8.9586 15.2075 0.5577 ECCS(–1) –0.7047 0.1573 <0.0001 
R-squared 0.9993 – – R-squared 0.6459 – –

































CONS. 0.0145 0.0125 0.2563 
lnMLN(–1) 0.3426 0.1170 0.0069 lnMLN(–1) 0.1468 0.0879 0.1069 
lnMPR –0.4176 0.2032 0.0497 lnMPR –0.2109 0.1896 0.2763 
GFClnMPR 0.1919 0.1653 0.2558 GFClnMPR 0.4052 0.2196 0.0764 
lnPRP 0.0140 0.0764 0.8556 lnPRP 0.1205 0.0533 0.0325 
lnPLA 0.8333 0.2231 0.0009 lnPLA 0.8004 0.1092 <0.0001 
lnPAS 0.4773 0.1676 0.0083 lnPAS 0.3869 0.0923 0.0003 
lnASX 0.7390 0.1613 0.0001 lnASX 0.6878 0.0895 <0.0001 
lnINB 0.0151 0.0762 0.8445 lnINB 0.0093 0.0392 0.8150 
lnINC 2.4868 0.5461 <0.0001 lnINC 2.0180 1.0171 0.0579 
GFClnINC –3.5596 0.8087 0.0002 GFClnINC –5.0007 1.0273 <0.0001 
GFC 38.5986 8.8458 0.0002 EMLN(–1) –1.1279 0.1829 <0.0001 
R-squared 0.9972 – – R-squared 0.9465 – –
F-statistic 875.2317 – <0.0001 F-statistic 41.7932 – <0.0001 
 
